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Tort Liability of Hospitals
B. Joan Holdridge*
N RECENT YEARS, hospitals have undergone changes both in
their financial and physical structures. For example, they no
longer are primarily charitable institutions, but in most cases are
largely self-supporting from the fees collected from their patients.
Furthermore, they have grown from small physical plants housing
only a few patients to huge complex groups of buildings housing
thousands of patients.
These changes have resulted in a general alteration of the
attitude of the courts toward the liability of hospitals for their
torts. From a position of almost total immunity the pendulum is
rapidly swinging toward liability generally for their negligence.
Since most jurisdictions classify hospitals into three types:
private, charitable, and public, when determining their liability
for particular acts, this article will discuss each of these classes
separately. However, for the sake of convenience, the general
rules of liability will be set forth in the discussion of private
hospitals.
Private Hospitals
A private hospital is generally liable in damages for injuries
to patients proximately resulting from the negligence of nurses
or other employees.' The degree of care required is one of reason-
able and ordinary care.2 This has been aptly stated to be "that
degree of care, skill and diligence used by hospitals generally in
that community, and by the express or implied contract of the
undertaking." 3 For, "the law demands reasonable care, such
care as a reasonable man would take under the circumstances
*B.S., Iowa State College; third year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School.
1 Thomas v. Seaside Memorial Hospital of Long Beach, 80 Cal. App. 2d
841, 183 P. 2d 288 (1947); South Highlands Infirmary v. Galloway, 233 Ala.
276, 171 So. 250 (1936); Parrish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933);
Stanley v. Schumpert, 117 La. 255, 41 So. 565, 6 L. R. A. N. S. 306, 116 Am.
St. Rep. 202, 8 Ann. Cas. 1044 (1906); Vun Eye v. Hammes, 147 F. Supp.
174 (D. C. Minn., 1956).
2 U. S. v. Gray, 199 F. 2d 239 (C. A. 10th, 1952); Crawford W. Long Me-
morial Hospital v. Hardeman, 84 Ga. App. 300, 66 S. E. 2d 63 (1951); Hay-
burst v. Boyd Hospital 43 Idaho 661, 254 P. 528 (1927); Hawkins v. Laughlin,
- Mo. App. -, 236 S. W. 2d 375 (1951).
3 South Highlands Infirmary v. Galloway, supra n. 1 at 252.
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existing, but no man is required to take measures against a
danger which the circumstances as known to him do not suggest
as likely to happen." 4 It is for this reason that a hospital has
never been held to be the insurer of the welfare of its patients.5
Since the extent of care required to be exercised by the
hospital depends on the condition of the patient, an act of omission
as well as commission may result in actionable negligence. 6 Thus,
a greater degree of care must be exercised with respect to a new-
born infant,7 a three-year old child,8 a person with suicidal
tendencies, 9 or an insane person. 10
The test for determining the proper care to be used is fore-
seeability. If the injury results from some harmful condition or
act of the patient, the liability of the hospital for the injury de-
pends on whether the condition or act of the patient was one that
could have been reasonably anticipated and the injury pre-
vented.1 ' There must be some indication that an injury will oc-
cur from the omission or commission of a particular act before
liability will ensue. 12
Since it is presumed that a hospital's physicians, nurses and
attendants possess the requisite degree of learning, skill and
ability necessary to the practice of their profession, and which
those similarly situated possess, and that they will use diligence
and their best judgment in the treatment and care of the patient, 13
the hospital may even be held responsible for knowledge of the
condition of the patient which could have been discovered by the
exercise of such requisite skill and training.14 Not only must
4 Smith v. Simpson, 221 Mo. App. 550, 288 S. W. 69, 72 (1926).
5 Gray v. Carter, 100 Cal. App. 2d 642, 224 P. 2d 28 (1950); St. Luke's Hos-
pital Ass'n. v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P. 2d 917, 31 A. L. R. 2d 1120 (1952);
Welsh v. Mercy Hospital, 65 Cal. App. 2d 473, 151 P. 2d 17 (1944).
6 Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont. 251, 7 P. 2d 228 (1932); Walls v. Boy-
ett, 216 Ark. 541, 226 S. W. 2d 552 (1950); O'Quin v. Baptist Memorial Hos-
pital, 184 Tenn. 570, 201 S. W. 2d 694 (1947).
7 Mahoney v. Harley Private Hospital, 279 Mass. 96, 180 N. E. 723 (1932).
8 St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n. v. Long, supra n. 5.
9 Hawthorne v. Blythewood, 118 Conn. 617, 174 A. 81 (1934).
10 Bennett v. Punton Sanitarium Ass'n., 213 Mo. App. 363, 249 S. W. 666
(1923).
11 Stansfield v. Gardner, 56 Ga. App. 634, 193 S. E. 375 (1937); James v.
Turner, 184 Tenn. 563, 201 S. W. 2d 691 (1941).
12 Mesedahl v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n., 194 Minn. 198, 259 N. W. 819
(1935); Lexington Hospital v. White, - Ky. -, 245 S. W. 2d 927 (1952).
13 Pangle v. Appalachian Hall, 190 N. C. 833, 131 S. E. 421 (1925); Googe
v. U. S., 101 F. Supp. 830 (D. C. N. Y., 1951).
14 Maki v. Murray Hospital, supra n. 6.
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the mental and physical condition of the patient be considered,
but also the conduct of the patient himself, both before and after
admission to the hospital.15 However, the hospital is under no
duty to investigate the past history of the patient, only to take
note of those facts given it at the time of the admission of the
patient. 16
It is not necessary that the precise injury that results be fore-
seeable, only that it is foreseeable that the particular act will
result in some injury.' 7 Although it has been held that the in-
jury must be likely to happen, rather than one that is more
likely to happen than not,1s a hospital has been held liable for
not foreseeing its first case of intrapartum psychosis, an unusual
mental derangement occurring at childbirth. 19 Even where it was
not foreseeable that an injury would result, a hospital has been
held liable for not exercising a proper degree of care.
2 °
Many causes of action are predicated on negligence in that
the patient was left unattended. Thus, where a nurse left an ex-
pectant mother unattended and the patient jumped or fell from
a window in the labor room, the court held that: "It is not ex-
pecting too much, where the expectant mother goes to the hos-
pital, that she should have constant and uninterrupted hospital
observation and attendance during her labor period." 21
15 Hignite's Admx. v. Louisville Neuropathic Sanitorium, 223 Ky. 496, 4
S. E. 2d 407 (1928). See also Dahlberg v. Jones, 233 Wis. 6, 285 N. W. 841
(1939); Davis v. Springfield Hospital, - Mo. App. -, 196 S. W. 104 (1917),
affd. 204 Mo. 626, 218 S. W. 696 (1920).
16 Mesedahl v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n., supra n. 12 at N. W. 823. "It would
be a harsh rule indeed that would charge the authorities of a general hos-
pital to go in search of the relatives of every patient entering it under the
care of a physician of his own or his relative's selection, and ascertain,
independently of the attending physician, the nature of the patient's ailment
and then to exercise their own judgment as to treatment required."
17 Santos v. Unity Hospital, 276 App. Div. 867, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 359, 361 (1949),
in dissenting opinion, "... The defendant cannot escape liability for neglect
of duty because it could not foresee the exact nature of the injury that
might result from its conduct."
18 Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital, 31 Tenn. App. 12, 211 S. W. 2d 450 (1948).
19 Flanagan v. Unity Hospital, 194 Misc. 2d, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 649, 651 (1949).
20 Rice v. California Lutheran Hospital, 27 Cal. 2d 296, 163 P. 2d 860 (1945),
where a nurse left a teapot of hot water on a bedside table of a patient
under the influence of narcotics and the patient burned herself. But see
Simmins v. South Shore Hospital, 340 Ill. App. 153, 91 N. E. 2d 135 (1950),
where patient suffered a heart attack while unattended and fell from a
narrow cart.
21 Flanagan v. Unity Hospital, supra n. 19 at 651. See also Murray v. St.
Mary's Hospital, 280 App. Div. 803, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 104 (1952); Garfield
Memorial Hospital v. Marshall, 92 App. D. C. 234, 204 F. 2d 721, 37 A. L. R.
(Continued on next page)
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The length of time the nurse is absent is not, in itself,
determinative of negligence, but it may be evidence of negligence.
For example, an absence of five minutes if a patient is on a bed
pan could be negligence.-2  One of twenty minutes, where a per-
son is bedfast and "needs to answer a call of nature," may fore-
seeably result in an injury-producing accident.23 Still another
case has held that leaving a patient recovering from typhoid fever
without proper wraps for two hours is negligence and that the
patient's contracting pneumonia was foreseeable. 24
Some courts have held that where a patient's condition makes
it necessary, it is the duty of the hospital to give him constant at-
tention.2 5 Therefore, if a patient is insane, the hospital owes a
duty to protect him from any possible self-harm or other reason-
ably apprehended danger, even if this should require a twenty-
four hour unbroken watch.20 And a prima facie case of negli-
gence is established if the hospital, knowing of suicidal tendencies,
leaves the patient unattended and he injures himself.27 It has
even been held to be actionable negligence to fail to bar the
windows28 or anticipate a suicidal scheme where the patient is
under constant surveillance. 29 But then a decision to the con-
trary; for example, a hospital was held not to be negligent where it
admitted a patient who had twice attempted to commit suicide and
it did not restrain him, the court holding that the hospital had
only a duty to observe him and give him medical treatment.30 In
another case, it was held unforeseeable that a patient would com-
(Continued from preceding page)
2d 1270 (1953); Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Branton, 218 Ala. 464, 118
So. 741 (1928); Harvey v. North Louisiana Sanitarium, 6 La. App. 230
(1927); Goff v. Doctors General Hospital of San Jose, - Cal. App. -,
333 P. 2d 29 (1958).
22 Croupp v. Garfield Park Sanitarium, 147 111. App. 7 (1909).
23 Jefferson Hospital, Inc., v. Van Lear, 185 Va. 74, 41 S. E. 2d 441 (1947).
24 Hayhurst v. Boyd Hospital, surpa, n. 2.
25 U. S. v. Gray, supra, n. 2; South Highlands Infirmary v. Galloway, supra.
n. 1; Emory University v. Shadburn, 47 Ga. App. 643, 171 S. E. 192 (1933),
affd. 180 Ga. 595, 180 S. E. 137 (1935).
26 Hawthorne v. Blythewood, Inc., supra, n. 9; U. S.' v. Gray, supra, n. 2.
27 Gries v. Long Island Home, 274 App. Div. 938, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 728 (1948).
28 Fowler v. Norway Sanitorium, 112 Ind. App. 347, 42 N. E. 2d 415 (1942).
29 Paulen v. Shennick, 291 Mich. 288, 289 N. W. 162 (1939), where a patient
complained she was warm, causing the attendant to open the window, and
then dropped her thimble under a radiator. While the attendant had her
back turned in an attempt to locate the thimble, the patient jumped out the
window.
30 Hohmann v. Riverlawn Sanatorium, 103 N. J. L. 458, 135 A. 817 (1927).
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mit suicide where he was undergoing treatment for dementia
praecox, one of the characteristics of which is a tendency to com-
mit suicide.3 1
Courts have also held that constant attendance upon the
patient is a requisite where he is delirious.3 2 Thus a hospital has
been held liable for the death of a patient who jumped from a
third floor window when the attendant left for five minutes, it
having been previously necessary to strap the patient in bed to
prevent him from injuring himself. 33 The hospital may even be
liable if a member of the family volunteers to watch over the
patient and fails to do so properly,34 or where members of the
family have been informed that private nurses are necessary and
they were not employed. 35 On the other hand a hospital was not
liable where the delirious patient jumped out a window while
unattended, there having been no previous indication of suicidal
tendencies. 30 And one court has even held that the hospital's li-
ability depended on whether a delirious patient had jumped or
fallen to his death, since his committing suicide was not fore-
seeable.37
Liability also may ensue where the patient is allowed to
escape, or injure himself in such an attempt. For example, where
a patient was permitted to walk about without restraint, the sani-
tarium, knowing of the patient's desire to escape, was held liable
for his death by being run over by a train.38 Similarly, where a
patient had delusions of persecution, the hospital could reason-
ably anticipate that she would attempt to escape.39 But where a
patient appeared to be suffering only from mental depression and
had always been "mild and docile," the court held that it was
31 Stansfield v. Gardner, supra, n. 11. See also Daley v. State, 273 App. Div.
552, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 584 (1948); affd. 298 N. Y. 880, 84 N. E. 2d 801 (1949).
32 Emory University v. Shadburn, supra, n. 25; Brawner v. Russell, 50 Ga.
App. 840, 179 S. E. 228 (1935); Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital, 31 Tenn. App.
12, 211 S. W. 2d 450 (1948).
33 Wetzel v. Omaha Maternity & General Hospital Assoc., 96 Neb. 636, 148
N. W. 582 (1914).
34 Tate v. McCall Hospital, 57 Ga. App. 824, 190 S. E. 906 (1938).
35 Rural Ed. Ass'n. v. Anderson, - Tenn. App. -, 261 S. W. 2d 151 (1953).
36 Breeze v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 264 Mo. 258, 174 S. W. 409 (1915).
37 Davis v. Springfield Hospital, supra, n. 15.
38 Arlington Heights Sanitarium v. Deaderick, 272 S. W. 497 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1925); Hebel v. Hinsdale Sanitarium & Hospital, 2 Ill. App. 2d 527, 119 N. E.
2d 506 (1934). See also Burtman v. State, 188 Misc. 153, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 271
(1947).
39 Emory University v. Shadburn, supra, n. 25.
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not foreseeable that the patient might attempt to escape and
injure herself.40
Failure by the hospital to use some physical means, such as
side boards, to prevent the patient from falling from bed and in-
juring himself, is generally actionable negligence.4 1 The mere
fact that the patient is old and partially paralyzed does not place
a duty on the hospital to put side rails on his bed.42 However, it
may be a question of fact for the jury whether the patient had
sufficient control of his faculties to be left alone, 43 or whether
a child is old enough to sleep in a bed without side rails.
44 It
has also been held to be a question of fact for the jury as to
whether placing a three-year old boy in an adult size bed with
rails so far apart that he squeezed his body between them, thus
catching his head so that he strangled, was such negligence as to
be actionable. 45
The hot-water bottle is a frequent villain in hospital tort
cases. 46 Whether the burn was caused by negligence, 47 or even
whether the condition complained of was a burn or not,48 has
40 Dahlberg v. Jones, supra, n. 15; Mesedahl v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n.,
supra, n. 12; Kubas v. State, 198 Misc. 130, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 408 (1949); afid.
278 App. Div. 887; 104 N. Y. S. 2d 856 (1951).
41 Silva v. Providence Hospital, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 87 P. 2d 374 (1939); Baptist
Memorial Hospital v. Marrable, 244 S. W. 2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App., 1951);
Morningside Hospital & Training School v. Pennington, 189 Okla. 170, 114
P. 2d 943 (1941), where patient's left leg was chained to bed and he fell
head-first on concrete; Beckford v. Carson C. Peck Memorial Hospital, 266
App. Div. 875, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 20 (1943); Baptist Convention v. Ferguson, 213
Ga. 441, 99 S. E. 2d 150 (1957); Hospital Authority v. Shubert, 96 Ga. App.
222, 99 S. E. 2d 708 (1957); Adams v. Ricks, 91 Ga. App. 494, 86 S. E. 2d
329 (1955).
42 Cochran v. Harrison Memorial Hospital, 42 Wash. 2d 264, 254 P. 2d 752
(1953), where patient fell from bed while attempting to reach washbasin
at nurse's direction.
43 South Highlands Infirmary v. Galloway, supra n. 1; Ford v. Vanderbilt
University, 40 Tenn. App. 87, 289 S. W. 2d 210 (1955), Spivey v. St. Thomas
Hospital, supra, n. 18.
44 Maxie v. Laurel General Hospital, 130 Miss. 246, 93 So. 817 (1922), where
an eight-year old boy fell out of bed.
45 St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n. v. Long, supra, n. 5.
46 Stuart Circle Hospital Corp. v. Curry, 173 Va. 136, 3 S. E. 2d 153, 124
A. L. R. 176 (1939); Duke Sanitarium v. Hearn, 159 Okla. 1, 13 P. 2d 183
(1932); Boetcher v. Budd, 61 N. D. 50, 237 N. W. 650 (1931); Corey v. Beck.
58 Idaho 281, 72 P. 2d 856 (1937); McBride v. Clara Barton Hospital, 75 Cal.
App. 161, 241 Pac. 941 (1925); Cornell v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., - La. App. -, 8 So. 2d 364 (1942); Las Vegas Hospital Ass'n. v.
Gaffney, 64 Nev. 225, 180 P. 2d 594 (1947).
47 Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 46 Del. 350, 83 A. 2d 753 (1951).
48 Norwood Hospital v. Brown, 219 Ala. 445, 122 So. 411 (1929); Mahoney v.
Harley Private Hospital, supra, n. 7.
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been held to be a question of fact for the jury. The hospital may
also be liable where burns result from the use of an electric
lamp.49 But a hospital is not liable where the burn results from
the contributory negligence of the patient.50
A hospital may be liable where it negligently permits the
transmission of a contagious disease or infection. 51 However, it
was held not to be liable where the alleged negligence was in
admitting the patient to the hospital without informing her of
the presence of an infectious disease.5 2 Of course, the hospital
will not be liable where there is no evidence that the alleged
negligence is the cause of the infection. 53 Liability has also been
denied where a patient was given a transfusion of blood contain-
ing serum hepatitus and he attempted to recover under the
theory of breach of warranty. 54
In the case of blood transfusions, liability has been allowed
where a patient was given a transfusion of the wrong type of
blood due to mislabeling by a technician, 55 and where a tech-
49 Woodhouse v. Knickerbocker Hospital, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 671 (1943), affd.
without op. 266 App. Div. 839, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 518 (1943); Cadicano v. Long
Island College Hospital, 308 N. Y. 196, 124 N. E. 2d 279 (1954); Dillon v.
Rockaway Beach Hospital, 284 N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. 2d 375 (1940).
50 Hamilton v. Corvallis General Hospital Ass'n., 146 Or. 168, 30 P. 2d 9
(1934), where patient fell asleep on electric heating pad.
51 Taaje v. St. Olaf Hospital, 199 Minn. 113, 271 N. W. 109 (1937), where
hospital permitted nurse with tuberculosis to handle babies; Kirchoff v. St.
Joseph's Hospital, 194 Minn. 436, 260 N. W. 509 (1935), where nurse put
baby infected with impetigo at mother's breast and upon discovering mis-
take, gave mother her own baby resulting in baby contracting impetigo;
Criss v. Angelus Hospital, 13 Cal. App. 2d 412, 56 P. 2d 1274 (1936) where
infant was infected with impetigo; Inderbitzen v. Lane Hospital, 124 Cal.
App. 462, 12 P. 2d 744 (1932), where expectant mother was examined
through the vagina by two men with unsterilized hands resulting in infec-
tion of uterus.
52 Roby v. Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn, 280 N. Y. 533, 20 N. E. 2d 6 (1939);
Jones v. Sisters of Charity, 173 S. W. 639 (Tex. Civ. App., 1915), where
patient contracted smallpox. But see Hewett v. Woman's Hospital Aid
Ass'n., 73 N. H. 556, 54 Atl. 190, 7 L. R. A. N. S. 496, 20 Am. Neg. Rep. 621
(1906) holding that a hospital would be liable to a nurse assigned to a
patient whom it knew to be suffering from a contagious disease, of which
fact the nurse was ignorant, and the nurse contracted the disease.
53 Brown v. Shannon West Texas Memorial Hospital, 222 S. W. 2d 248 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1949); Sheehan v. Strong, 257 Mass. 525, 154 N. E. 253 (1926);
Masonic Hospital Ass'n. v. Taggart, 171 Okla. 563, 43 P. 2d 1142 (1935),
where infection was allegedly caused by negligent hypodermic injection.
54 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N. Y. 100, 123 N. E. 2d 792 (1954);
Gile v. Kennewick Public Hospital Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P. 2d 662, 59
A. L. R. 2d 761 (1956).
55 Mississippi Baptists Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142, 56
So. 2d 709, 25 A. L. R. 2d 12 (1951).
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nician negligently determined the blood type.56 The hospital was
also held liable where an intern and a nurse gave the wrong
patient a transfusion5 7 and the blood was allowed to flow into
the patient's tissues rather than into the vein.58
Since a hospital has a duty to provide proper and safe
equipment for the treatment of the patient, any breach of this
duty will result in a cause of action. 59 Thus, where a drainage
hole in a delivery table was not properly padded and the plain-
tiff's baby dropped through the hole, hitting its head on a pan
below, the hospital was liable.60 So also, where a patient is in-
jured by a defective wheelchair,61 bed,0 2 lamp,63 electric fan,64 or
x-ray equipment,6 5 the hospital is liable. Even a bed which
has negligently been allowed to become wet due to a leak in the
roof is such defective equipment as to cause liability to arise.0 6
But it has been held that where a hospital provides an article
which is obviously unfit for the use for which it is furnished, and
the patient's physician and nurse use it in violation of all of the
standards of care of medical practice, the hospital cannot be
chargeable with any injurious effect which may result there-
from.67
Hospitals have also been held liable in damages for injuries
56 Berg v. New York Soc. for Relief of the Ruptured & Crippled, 1 N. Y.
2d 499, 154 N. Y. S. 2d 455, 136 N. E. 2d 523 (1956); Joseph v. W. H. Groves
Latter Day Saints Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P. 2d 330 (1957); National
Homeopathic Hospital v. Phillips, 86 App. D. C. 295, 181 F. 2d 293 (1950).
57 Necolayff v. Genesee Hospital, 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 832
(1946), affd. without op. 296 N. Y. 936, 73 N. E. 2d 117 (1946).
58 Sherman v. Hartman, 137 Cal. App. 2d 589, 290 P. 2d 874 (1955).
59 Medical & Surgical Memorial Hospital v. Cauthorn, 229 S. W. 2d 932 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1949).
60 Hord v. National Homeopathic Hospital, 102 F. Supp. 792 (D. C. D. C.,
1952), affd. 92 App. D. C. 204, 204 F. 2d 397 (1952).
61 Holtforth v. Rochester General Hospital, 304 N. Y. 27, 105 N. E. 2d 610,
31 A. L. R. 2d 1113 (1952).
62 Welsh v. Mercy Hospital, supra, n. 5; St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n. v. Long,
supra, n. 5; Gordon v. Harbor Hospital, Inc., 275 App. Div. 1047, 92 N. Y. S.
2d 101 (1949); Pivar v. Manhattan General, Inc., 279 App. Div. 522, 110
N. Y. S. 2d 786 (1952).
63 Baker v. Leland Stanford Junior University, 133 Cal. App. 243, 23 P. 2d
1071 (1933).
64 Gardner v. Newnan Hospital, 58 Ga. App. 104, 198 S. E. 122 (1938).
65 Runyan v. Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481, 228 S. W. 397, 13 A. L. R. 1403, 20
N. C. C. A. 373 (1921).
66 Tulsa Hospital Ass'n. v. Juby, 73 Okla. 243, 175 Pac. 519, 22 A. L. R. 333
(1918).




resulting from negligent handling of the patient by their ambu-
lance attendants,68 administration of an excessively hot douche
by a nurse,69 failure properly to diagnose an abnormal condi-
tion70 or to administer the proper drug,71 and for negligent oper-
ation of x-ray equipment.7
2
Patients injured by other patients may recover where it is
foreseeable that a patient may attempt to harm another.
7 3
Liability is predicated upon the theory that a hospital is under
a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of
third persons as to prevent them from intentionally harming a
patient, and this duty is directly proportional to the patient's
inability to look after his own safety.7 4
Quite frequently it is impossible for a patient to point his
finger at the exact cause of his injury. As one court has put it:
"The passenger sitting awake in a railroad car at the time of a
collision, the pedestrian walking along the street . . . , are surely
not more entitled to an explanation than the unconscious patient
on the operating table." 75 It is for this reason that the use of
68 Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N. Y. 663, 7 N. E. 2d
28, 109 A. L. R. 1197 (1937); McCormack v. Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn,
246 App. Div. 731, 283 N. Y. S. 737 (1935); Lornitzo v. Rhode Island Hos-
pital, 79 R. I. 455, 89 A. 2d 831 (1952).
69 Mills v. Richardson, 126 Me. 244, 137 A. 689 (1927).
70 Hansch v. Hacket, 190 Wash. 97, 66 P. 2d 1129 (1937), where staff physi-
cian's cursory examinations of expectant mother failed to reveal symptoms
of eclampsia contravis which caused death of patient; Edwards v. West
Texas Hospital, 89 S. W. 2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App., 1953), where staff physician
diagnosed plaintiff's condition as abdominal tumor when in fact it was a
second undelivered fetus; Stansfield v. Gardner, supra, n. 11, where frac-
tures of back were not detected.
71 Costley v. United States, 181 F. 2d 723 (C. A. 5th, 1950), where patient
paralyzed from waist down by administration of another drug for spinal
anesthetic; Volk v. City of New York, 284 N. Y. 279, 30 N. E. 2d 596 (1940);
Lubowsky v. State of New York, 260 App. Div. 416, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 633
(1940), affd. 285 N. Y. 701, 34 N. E. 2d 385 (1941); Simons v. Northern P. R.
Co., 94 Mont. 355, 22 P. 2d 609 (1933). But see Forrest v. Red Cross Hos-
pital, Inc., - Ky. -, 265 S. W. 2d 80 (1954), where adulterated food was
served.
72 Thomas v. Lobrano, - La. App. -, 76 So. 2d 599 (1955); Marble
v. Nicholas Senn Hospital Ass'n, 102 Neb. 343, 167 N. W. 208 (1918), where
doctor holding plaintiff was injured; Rabasco v. New Rochelle Hospital
Ass'n., 266 App. Div. 971, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 293 (1943), where father holding
child to be X-rayed was shocked; Taylor v. Beekman Hospital, 270 App.
Div. 1020, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 637 (1946).
73 Dowly v. State, 190 Misc. 16, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 573 (1947); Tabor v. State,
186 Misc. 736, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 380 (1946); Schoff v. State, 8 Misc. 940, 169
N. Y. S. 2d 245 (1957).
74 Sylvester v. Northwestern Hospital of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 384, 53
N. W. 2d 17 (1952).
75 Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 496, 154 P. 2d 687 (1945).
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the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is generally allowed in cases of
injury during the period when the patient is unconscious.76 It
has been applied where the patient has been burned, 77 has
fallen,78 or been injured during the operation. 79 Furthermore
the doctrine has been held to be applicable even where there
are a number of defendants, as in operation cases.80 However, it
should be remembered that res ipsa loquitur raises only a suffi-
cient inference of negligence to establish a prima facie case,
and the defendant is entitled to introduce evidence to overcome
this rebuttable inference.8 ' And, of course, as in other negli-
gence actions, where the acts constituting the alleged negligence
are known and set forth in detail, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is eliminated, even if the case is such that the doctrine might
otherwise have been properly applied.8 2 Nor is the doctrine
applicable where the condition complained of could have arisen
from some other cause than the alleged injury or accident,8 3 or
76 Dierman v. Providence Hospital, 31 Cal. 2d 290, 177 P. 2d 603 (1947);
Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P. 2d 915 (1955); Milias v. Wheeler Hos-
pital, - Cal. App. -, 241 P. 2d 684 (1952); West Coast Hospital Ass'n.
v. Webb, - Fla. -, 52 So. 2d 803 (1951); Andrepont v. Ochsner, - La. App.
-, 84 So. 2d 63 (1955); Las Vagas Hospital Ass'n. v. Gaffney, 64 Nev. 225,
180 P. 2d 594 (1947).
77 Dierman v. Providence Hospital, supra, n. 76; Quillen v. Skaggs, 233 Ky.
171, 25 S. W. 2d 33 (1930); Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675,
99 S. W. 453 (1907); Las Vegas Hospital Ass'n. v. Gaffney, supra, n. 76; Pliss
v. 83d Foundation, - Misc. -, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 727 (1947); Danville Com-
munity Hospital v. Thompson, 186 Va. 746, 43 S. E. 2d 746, 43 S. E. 2d 882,
173 A. L. R. 525 (1947).
78 Gallachicco v. State, - Misc. -, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 439 (1943), where men-
tal defective fell down elevator shaft; Maki v. Murray Hospital, supra, n. 6;
Morningside Hospital & Training School v. Pennington, supra, n. 41; Rich-
ardson v. Dumas, 106 Miss. 664, 64 So. 459 (1914).
79 Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hospital Dist., - Cal. App. -, 246
P. 2d 970 (1952); subsequent op. 41 Cal. 2d 33, 257 P. 2d 22 (1953); Kemal-
yan v. Henderson, 45 Wash. 2d 693, 277 P. 2d 372 (1954).
80 Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital, 18 Cal. 2d 129, 114 F. 2d 1 (1941), broken
rib; Ybarra v. Spangard, supra, n. 75, injured shoulder; Leonard v. Watson-
ville Community Hospital, 47 Cal. 2d 509, 305 P. 2d 36 (1956), instrument
left in abdomen; Frost v. Des Moines Still College, 248 Iowa 294, 79 N. W.
2d 306 (1956); Oldis v. La Societe Francaise de Bienfaisance Mutuelle, 130
Cal. App. 2d 461, 279 P. 2d 184 (1955). But hospital was not liable where
gauze was left in patient's abdomen after emergency requiring massive
packing to save patient's life. Landsberg v. Kolodny, 145 Cal. App. 2d 158,
302 P. 2d 86 (1956).
81 Quillen v. Skaggs, supra, n. 77.
82 Halleman v. Prindle, 220 Cal. 46, 29 P. 2d 202 (1934).
83 White v. Executive Committee of Baptist Convention, 65 Ga. App. 840, 16
S. E. 2d 605 (1941); Hazard Hospital Co. v. Combs, 263 Ky. 252, 925 S. W.
2d 35 (1936); Mahoney v. Private Hospital, supra, n. 7; Collings v. North-
western Hospital, 202 Minn. 139, 277 N. W. 910 (1938); Wallstedt v. Swedish
Hospital, 220 Minn. 274, 19 N. W. 2d 426 (1945); Poor Sisters of St. Francis
v. Long, 190 Tenn. 434, 230 S. W. 2d 659 (1950).
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where the instrumentality causing the injury is not in the sole
control of the hospital.8 4
Hospitals often base their defense to actions in negligence
on the theory that the doctor, nurse, intern or technician who
performed the negligent act was an independent contractor, 5
or that the employee was working under the direction of an
independent contractor (borrowed servant doctrine) ,6 or that
the act was professional in character and thus would be ultra
vires if performed by the hospital.8 7
The independent contractor concept, as a defense, has been
strongly criticized recently in that other corporations, such as
airlines, are liable for the negligent acts of professionals, such
as pilots, working for them.88 Therefore, there have been sev-
eral recent decisions in which a hospital has been held liable
for the negligence of its staff physician when acting within the
course and scope of his employment.8 9 But, under the majority
rule, a hospital was not even liable where it owned the x-ray
equipment, employed the technicians who operated it, and
shared in the profits with the roentgenologist who supervised it;
84 Phillipsen v. Hunt, 129 Or. 242, 270 Pac. 255 (1929); Ware v. Culp, 24 Cal.
App. 2d 22, 74 P. 2d 283 (1937), where heating pad was operated by private
nurse; Dittert v. Fischer, 148 Or. 366, 36 P. 2d 592 (1934), where heating pad
was operated by patient; Mahoney v. Harley Private Hospital, supra, n. 7;
Wallstedt v. Swedish Hospital, supra, n. 83; South Highlands Infirmary v.
Galloway, supra, n. 1; White v. Executive Committee of Baptist Convention,
supra, n. 83.
85 Stewart v. Crook Sanatorium, 17 Tenn. App. 589, 59 S. W. 2d 259 (1933),
where physician was also president and general manager of hospital; Pen-
land v. French Broad Hospital, 199 N. C. 314, 154 S. E. 406 (1930); Johnson
v. City Hospital Co., 196 N. C. 610, 146 S. E. 573 (1929); Jeter v. Davis, 33
Ga. App. 733, 127 S. E. 898 (1925); Mayers v. Litoro, 316 P. 2d 351 (1957).
86 Byrd v. Marion General Hospital, 202 N. C. 337, 162 S. E. 738 (1932);
Randolph v. Oklahoma City General Hospital, 180 Okla. 513, 71 P. 2d 607 (1937).
87 Iterman v. Baker, - Ind. -, 15 N. E. 2d 365 (1938).
88 Stuart Circle Hospital Corp. v. Curry, supra n. 47 at 183: "The object,
aim and purpose of a hospital, the reason for its establishment and opera-
tion, is to render and perform medical treatment and nursing of a skilled
character. It is the facility for affording the patient a higher and greater
degree of medical attention than would be ordinarily possible outside of a
hospital that makes it desirable. The opportunity to render such service
enables a hospital to make a higher charge than a hotel or boarding house.
The desirability of securing the needed service provides inducement for the
patient to enter the hospital. The patient comes to the hospital for advice,
aid and treatment."
89 Vaughan v. Memorial Hospital, 100 W. Va. 290, 130 S. E. 481 (1925);
Gilstrap v. Osteopathic Sanatorium, 224 Mo. App. 798, 24 S. W. 2d 749
(1929); Edwards v. West Texas Hospital, supra, n. 70; Garfield Memorial
Hospital v. Marshall, supra, n. 21; Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N. W.
2d 639 (1952).
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the roentgenologist being deemed an independent contractor.90
Another recent case held that it was a question of fact for the
jury whether an anesthetist employed by the hospital was an
independent contractor or an agent of the hospital.9l
Criticism of the rule that a hospital is not liable for the
torts of its servants when they are under the direction of an
outside physician is also growing. One court even suggested that
for a physician, during an operation, to remove his attention
from the patient to examine for probable errors in the routine
duties of his trained assistants would probably be construed to
be a negligent act in itself.9 2 Nevertheless, courts are still hold-
ing that the hospital is not liable for the actions of its nurses
under the direction of the patient's physician.
9
A few jurisdictions hold that whether or not a hospital is
liable for the acts of its employees depends on whether the acts
are administrative or medical. 4 Since the selection and employ-
ment of the staff is administrative, all jurisdictions hold that
negligence in selecting the staff is actionable by any patient
injured thereby.9 5 This administrative-medical distinction has
led to some ridiculous decisions.90 For example, placing a lamp
90 Hull v. Enid General Hospital Foundation, 194 Okla. 446, 152 P. 2d 693
(1944). See also Runyan v. Goodrum, supra, n. 65; Miami v. Brooks, - Fla.
-, 70 So. 2d 306 (1954); Hoke v. Harrisburg Hospital, Inc., 281 Ill. App. 247,
(1935).
91 Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P. 2d 915 (1955).
92 Cornell v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., - La. App. -, 8 So.
2d 364 (1942), where the court said "By the same token, a physician would
be required to examine and test the sterile condition of every instrument
and the potency of every medicine used by him and supplied by the hos-
pital." See also Cavero v. Franklin General Benevolent Society, 36 Cal. App.
2d 301, 223 P. 2d 471 (1950).
93 Minogue v. Rutland Hospital, Inc., - Vt. -, 125 A. 2d 796 (1956); Swig-
erd v. City of Ortonville, 246 Minn. 339, 75 N. W. 2d 217 (1956); St. Paul-
Mercury Indemnity Co. v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 212 Minn. 558, 4 N. W. 2d
637 (1942); Aderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203, 221 Pac. 752 (1923).
94 Fowler v. Norway Sanatorium, supra, n. 28.
95 Wilson v. Brooklyn Homeopathic Hospital, 98 App. Div. 37, 89 N. Y. S.
619 (1904); Pangle v. Appalachian Hall, supra n. 13; Canney v. Sisters of
Charity of House of Providence, 15 Wash. 2d 325, 130 P. 2d 899 (1942).
96 Some of these unrealistic distinctions led an English court in Gold v.
Essex County Council, 2 K. B. 293, 2 All. Eng. Rep. 237, 239 (1942) to say:
"Nursing, it appears to me, is just what the patient is entitled to expect
from the institution, and the relationship of the nurses to the institution
supports the inference that they are equipped to nurse the patients... The
idea that in the case of a voluntary hospital the only obligation which the
hospital undertakes to perform by its nursing staff is, not the essential work
of nursing, but only so-called administrative work, appears to me, with all
respect to those who have thought otherwise, not merely unworkable in
(Continued on next page)
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss3/4
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
too close to an infant in an effort to raise its temperature is a
medical act 97 but the negligent use of a vaporizer is an ad-
ministrative actYs Applying a scalding hot water bottle to the
plaintiff while in bed is medical negligence, 99 but placing it in
the bed while he is temporarily absent therefrom is administra-
tive negligence. 00 Leaving a mentally disturbed person alone
near an open window with the result that the patient commits
suicide is administrative negligence,' 10 but when the deranged
person is left to jump under a passing bus, the negligence is
medical. 10 2 Giving the wrong patient a blood transfusion is an
administrative act, 10 3 but the taking of the blood is a medical
act.10 4  Giving an injection with an improperly sterilized hypo-
dermic needle is administrative, 10 but improperly administering
a hypodermic injection is medical. 10 Failing to decide that side
boards should be used is medical,' 07 but failing to place side
boards on a bed after a nurse decided that they were necessary
is administrative,1 0 8 and so on ad injinitum. One court even held
that an intern was an independent contractor when he injured
a patient by an act characterized as medical, but that he was an
(Continued from preceding page)
practice, but contrary to the plain sense of the position. If correct, it would
mean that a hospital undertakes to carry up the patient's tea by its nurse
and is liable if the nurse negligently spills the hot water on the patient;
but that the true function of a nurse, namely that of nursing, is not one
which the nurse is employed to perform on behalf of the hospital..
97 Cadicano v. Long Island College Hospital, supra, n. 49.
98 Capusso v. Square Sanitarium, Inc., -Misc. -, 155 N. Y. S. 2d 213 (1956).
99 Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 88, 146 N. E. 199 (1924);
Southerland v. New York Polyclinic Hospital, 273 App. Div. 29, 75 N. Y. S.
2d 135 (1947).
100 Iacano v. New York Polyclinic Hospital, 269 App. Div. 955, 58 N. Y. S.
2d 244 (1945), affd. 296 N. Y. 502, 68 N. E. 2d 450 (1946).
101 Santos v. Unity Hospital, supra, n. 17; Gries v. Long Island Home, supra,
n. 27.
102 Mills v. Society of New York Hospital, 242 App. Div. 245, 274 N. Y.
Supp. 233 (1934), affd. 270 N. Y. 594, 1 N. E. 2d 346 (1934).
103 Necolayff v. Genessee Hospital, supra, n. 57.
104 Berg v. New York Soc. for Relief of Ruptured & Crippled, supra, n. 56.
305 Peck v. Charles B. Towns Hospital, 275 App. Div. 302, 89 N. Y. S. 2d
190 (1949).
306 Bryant v. Presbyterian Hospital in City of New York, 309 N. Y. S. 38,
110 N. E. 2d 391 (1953).
107 Grace v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital, 276 App. Div. 955, 95
N. Y. S. 2d 185 (1950).
1o Ranelli v. Society of New York Hospital, 236 N. Y. 268, 140 N. E. 694
(1920).
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employee of the hospital entitled to compensation since he
happened to injure himself by the same act. 0 9
Just recently, New York, which originated the medical-
administrative test, 110 apparently completely abandoned it as
unworkable and against public policy as it exists today, although
in a case just decided in the Appellate Division, it was held that
mere evidence of negligence is not sufficient to hold a hospital
liable for the malpractice of its physician."' Thus, there is once
again doubt as to the exact position of New York as regards
hospital liability. It will be interesting to see if that case is heard
by the Court of Appeals, and, if so, exactly how they will decide
it.
Charitable Hospitals
The law dealing with the immunity of charities from liability
in damages for torts is confused, to say the least. On one side
are the jurisdictions which grant no immunity at all. On the
other, those which grant absolute immunity from liability. And
somewhere in the middle, those which grant a limited immunity
depending upon the victim's status as a servant, stranger or
beneficiary of the charity, and the nature of the negligence
charged.
Thus, in Alabama, 1 12 Alaska, 11 3 Arizona," 4 California,115
109 Gold v. Essex County Council, 2 K. B. 293, 2 All Eng. Rep. 237, (1942).
110 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E.
92, 52 L. R. A. N. S. 505, Ann. Cas. 1915C 581 (1914).
111 Bing v. Thunig, 2 N. Y. 2d 656, 667, 163 N. Y. S. 2d 3, 11, 143 N. E. 2d
3, 8 (1957), where the court said: "Hospitals should, in short, shoulder the
responsibilities borne by everyone else. There is no reason to continue their
exemption from the universal rule of respondeat superior. The test should
be, for these institutions, whether charitable or profit-making, as it is for
every other employer, was the person who committed the negligent injury-
producing act one of its employees and, if he was, was he acting within
the scope of his employment." See also Morwin v. Albany Hospital, 7 A. D.
2d 582, 185 N. Y. S. 2d 85, 88 (1959) in which the court said: "In order to hold
a hospital liable under Bing v. Thunig, there must be negligence. If the
acts complained of as being negligent are such as require professional skill
and knowledge, then it is a case of malpractice. Being malpractice, the case
must conform to the evidential rules long invoked in such cases. Any
argument that Bing v. Thunig altered the standard of proof in malpractice
cases is without foundation."
112 Alabama Baptist Hospital Bd. v. Carter, 226 Ala. 109, 145 So. 443 (1932);
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Asso., 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, L. R. A. 1915D 1167,
10 N. C. C. A. 361 (1915).
113 Tuengel v. Sitka, Alaska, 118 F. Supp. 399 (D. C. Alaska, 1954).
114 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951).
115 Silva v. Providence Hospital, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P. 2d 798 (1939); England
v. Hospital of Good Samaritan, 14 Cal. 2d 791, 97 P. 2d 813 (1939), affg. 88
(Continued on next page)
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Delaware," 6 Florida," 7 Idaho," 8  Iowa,"l9  Kansas, 120  Minne-
sota,' Mississippi,122 New Hampshire, 123 New Jersey, 24 New
York,12 5 North Dakota,12 Ohio, 12 7 Puerto Rico, 128 Utah,129 Ver-
mont,13 0 and Washington, 131 (twenty jurisdictions in all), char-
itable hospitals are liable for their torts to the same extent as a
private person or a private corporation. It is probable that the
(Continued from preceding page)
P. 2d 227 (Cal. App., 1939), former apps. 16 Cal. App. 2d 640, 61 P. 2d 48
and 22 Cal. App. 2d 226, 70 P. 2d 692 (1937); Inderbitzen v. Lane Hospital,
124 Cal. App. 462, 12 P. 2d 744 (1932), reh. den. 124 Cal. App. 469, 13 P. 2d
905 (1932).
116 Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 83 A. 2d 753 (Del., 1951).
117 Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344, 133
A. L. R. 809 (1940); Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hospital, 65 So. 2d 40 (Fla.,
1953); Bourgeous v. Dade County, 99 So. 2d 575 (Fla., 1957).
118 Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 297 P. 2d 1041 (Idaho,
1956).
119 Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Asso., 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N. W. 2d 151
(1950); Witmer v. Letts, 80 N. W. 2d 561 (Iowa, 1957).
120 Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954); Stolp
v. Arkansas City, 180 Kan. 197, 303 P. 2d 123 (1956); Carlbury v. Wesley
Hospital & Nurse Training School, 182 Kan. 634, 323 P. 2d 638 (1958).
121 Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N. W.
699 (1920); St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 212 Minn.
558, 4 N. W. 2d 637 (1942); Borwege v. Owatonna, 190 Minn. 394, 251 N. W.
915 (1933); McInerny v. St. Luke's Hospital Asso., 122 Minn. 10, 141 N. W.
837, 46 L. R. A. N. S. 548 (1913); Maki v. St. Luke's Hospital Asso., 122
Minn. 444, 142 N. W. 705 (1913); Nelson v. Swedish Hospital, 241 Minn. 551,
64 N. W. 2d 38 (1954); Swigerd v. Ortonville, 246 Minn. 339, 75 N. W. 2d
217 (1956); Clements v. Swedish Hospital, 89 N. W. 2d 162 (Minn., 1958);
Mattson v. St. Luke's Hospital, 89 N. W. 2d 743 (Minn., 1958).
122 Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 55 So. 2d 142, 25 A. L. R. 2d
12 (Miss., 1951). Palmer v. Clarksdale Hospital, 57 So. 2d 473 (Miss., 1952).
123 Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 90 N. H. 337, 9 A. 2d 761 (1939);
Hewett v. Woman's Hospital Aid Asso., 73 N. H. 556, 64 A. 190, 7 L. R. A.
N. S. 496 (1906); Kardelas v. Dover, 79 N. H. 359, 111 A. 2d 327 (1955).
124 Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N. J. 29, 141 A. 2d 276
(1958); but judgments are limited by statute to no more than $10,000.00.
125 Bing v. Thunig, 2 N. Y. 2d 656, 163 N. Y. S. 2d 3, 143 N. E. 2d 3 (1957).
126 Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 74 N. D. 525, 23 N. W. 2d
247, 166 A. L. R. 99 (1946).
127 Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 60 Ohio Ops. 121, 135
N. E. 2d 410 (1956).
128 Talvarez v. San Juan Lodge, 68 Puerto Rico 681 (1948).
129 Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Asso., 94 Utah 460, 78
P. 2d 645 (1938), former app. 89 Utah 222, 51 P. 2d 229 (1935).
130 Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230, 25 A. L. R.
2d 1 (1950).
131 Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Asso., 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260
P. 2d 765 (1953).
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District of Columbia 132 and Oklahoma, 133 also subscribe to the
theory of total liability, but it has not been definitely settled in
either jurisdiction. In Hawaii,1 34 a charity is not immune when
engaged in non-charitable activities, but there has been no de-
cision as to charitable immunity itself.
In ten jurisdictions, Arkansas, 13 Kentucky, 136 Maryland,13 7
Massachusetts,'" Missouri,1 39 Oregon,1 40 Pennsylvania,'1 41 Rhode
132 President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 App. D. C.
123, 130 F. 2d 810 (1942), where three judges held that charities enjoy no
immunity from tort liability, but case presented no facts requiring such a
holding. The question was left open in White v. Central Dispensary &
Emergency Hospital, 69 App. D. C. 122, 99 F. 2d 355, 119 A. L. R. 1002 (1938),
while a trial court has held that such a hospital is immune from liability
where there is no claim that the personnel was negligently selected by the
hospital or that the hospital itself was negligent. White v. Providence Hos-
pital, 80 F. Supp. 76 (D. C. D. C., 1943).
133 Shawnee v. Roush, 101 Okla. 60, 223 P. 354 (1923).
134 Luhe v. Honolulu Lodge, 31 Hawaii 740 (1931).
135 Michael v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 92 F. Supp. (D. C. Ark., 1950);
Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S. W. 2d 548 (1953);
Cabbiness v. North Little Rock, 307 S. W. 2d 529 (Ark., 1957).
136 Emery v. Jewish Hospital Asso., 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577, 21 N. C. C. A.
302 (1921); University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S. W. 219,
14 L. R. A. N. S. 784, 128 Am. St. Rep. 355 (1907); Cook v. John N. Norton
Memorial Infirmary, 180 Ky. 331, 202 S. W. 874, L. R. A. 1918E 647 (1918);
Pikeville Methodist Hospital v. Donahoe, 221 Ky. 538, 299 S. W. 159 (1927);
Forrest v. Red Cross Hospital, Inc., 265 S. W. 2d 80 (Ky., 1954); St. Salburg
Monastery of Genedicting Sisters v. Feltaer's Adm., 275 S. W. 2d 784 (Ky.,
1955).
137 Howard v. South Baltimore General Hospital, 191 Md. 617, 62 A. 2d 574
(1948); Loeffler v. Sheppard & E. P. Hospital, 130 Md. 265, 100 A. 301, L. R. A.
1917D 967 (1917); Gorman v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 121 A. 2d 812
(Md., 1956).
138 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep.
529 (1876); Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E.
392, 14 A. L. R. 563 (1920); Kidd v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital,
237 Mass. 500, 130 N. E. 55 (1921); Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital, 264
Mass. 363, 141 N. E. 113 (1923); Beverley Hospital v. Early, 292 Mass. 201,
197 N. E. 641, 100 A. L. R. 1332 (1935); Bearse v. New England Deaconess
Hospital, 321 Mass. 750, 72 N. E. 2d 743 (1947); Mastrangelo v. Maverick Dis-
pensary, 330 Mass. 708, 115 N. E. 2d 455 (1953).
139 Dille v. St. Luke's Hospital, 355 Mo. 435, 196 S. W. 2d 615 (1946); Hin-
man v. Berkman, 85 F. Supp. 2 (D. C. Mo., 1949); Stecten v. Jewish Memorial
Hospital Asso., 239 Mo. App. 38, 187 S. W. 2d 469 (1945); Whittaker v. St.
Luke's Hospital, 137 Mo. App. 116, 117 S. W. 1189 (1908); Adams v. Uni-
versity Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453 (1907); Nicholas v. Evan-
gelical Deaconess Home and Hospital, 281 Mo. 182, 219 S. W. 643 (1920);
Roberts v. Kirksville College, 16 S. W. 2d 625 (Mo. App., 1929); Kreuger v.
Schmiechen, 264 S. W. 2d 311 (Mo., 1954).
140 Gregory v. Salem General Hospital, 175 Or. 464, 153 P. 2d 837 (1944);
Ackerman v. Physicians & Surgeons Hospital, 207 Or. 646, 298 P. 2d 1026
(1956).
(Continued on next page)
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Island,142 South Carolina, 143 and Wisconsin 14 4, the courts give
absolute immunity to charitable hospitals for damage in torts.
Three states, Colorado,'1 4 5 Illinois, 14 and Tennessee,' 47 allow
recovery by either a paying patient or a beneficiary of the char-
ity, but execution under a judgment cannot be levied against the
charitable trust property, only against the income from paying
patients.
Three jurisdictions, Maine, 148 Nebraska, 14  and Nevada, 150
hold that a charity is liable to its servants and strangers for
negligent torts, but is not liable to beneficiaries of the charity,
even if they are paying patients.
(Continued from preceding page)
141 Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 A. 1087, 136 Am. St. Rep.
879, 2 N. C. C. A. 381 (1910); Paterline v. Memorial Hospital Asso., 247 F.
639 (C. A. 3d, 1918), cert. den. 246 U. S. 665, 62 L. Ed. 929, 38 S. Ct. 334
(1918); Knecht v. St. Mary's Hospital, 392 Pa. 75, 140 A. 2d 30 (1958);
Matute v. Carson Long Institute, 160 F. Supp. 827 (D. C. Pa., 1958).
142 Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879)
held hospital liable; subsequently statute passed giving charitable hospital
absolute immunity.
143 Ludler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S. C. 25, 81 S. E. 512 (1914).
144 Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160 N. W. 173 (1916); Schau v. Morgan,
241 Wis. 334, 6 N. W. 2d 212 (1942). But immunity does not extend to breach
of statutory duty: Grabenski v. St. Francis Hospital, 266 Wis. 339, 63 N. W.
2d 693 (1954); Watey v. Carmelite Sisters, etc., 274 Wis. 415, 80 N. W. 2d
397 (1957).
145 St. Luke's Hospital Asso. v. Long, 240 P. 2d 917 (Colo., 1952); O'Connor
v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Asso., 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835, 133 A. L. R.
819 (1939).
146 Marabia v. Mary Thompson Hospital, 309 Ill. 147, 140 N. E. 836 (1923);
Wattman v. St. Luke's Hospital Assn., 314 Ill. App. 244, 41 N. E. 2d 314
(1942); Mater v. Silver Cross Hospital, 285 fll. App. 437, 2 N. E. 2d 138
(1936); Armstrong v. Wesley Hospital, 170 Ill. App. 81 (1912).
147 McLeod v. St. Thomas Hospital, 170 Tenn. 423, 95 S. W. 2d 917 (1936);
Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Coulens, 176 Tenn. 300, 140 S. W. 2d 1088 (1940);
O'Quinn v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 184 Tenn. 570, 201 S. W. 2d 694, 22
N. C. C. A. N. S. 1 (1947); Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App.
135, 127 S. W. 2d 284 (1938); Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital, 31 Tenn. App.
12, 211 S. W. 2d 450 (1947); Edwards v. Kings Mountain Memorial Hospital
Asso., 118 F. Supp. 417 (D. C. Tenn., 1954).
148 Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 A. 898, 33 L. R. A.
N. S. 141 (1910).
149 Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hospital Asso., 102 Neb. 343, 167 N. W. 208
(1918); Sibelia v. Paxton Memorial Hospital, 121 Neb. 860, 238 N. W. 751
(1931); Duncan v. Nebraska Sanitarium & Benev. Asso., 92 Neb. 162, 137
N. W. 1120, 41 L. R. A. N. S. 973, Ann. Cas. 1913E 1127 (1912); Muller v.
Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 160 Neb. 279, 70 N. W. 2d 86 (1955); Cheathan
v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hospital, 160 Nev. 297, 70 N. W. 2d 96 (1955).
150 Bruce v. Y. M. C. A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 P. 798 (1929).
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In eight jurisdictions, Connecticut,151 Indiana, 15 2 Louisi-
ana,153 Michigan, 154 Texas,155 Virginia,156 West Virginia, 157 and
Wyoming,5 8 charitable hospitals are liable not only to strangers
and their servants, but also to a beneficiary, whether a paying
patient or not, if they have been negligent in the selection and
retention of their employees or other administrative acts. In
1'1 Cohen v. General Hospital Soc., 113 Conn. 188, 154 A. 435 (1931); Hali-
burton v. General Hospital Soc., 133 Conn. 61, 48 A. 2d 261, 20 N. C. C. A.
N. S. 505 (1946); Richards v. Grace-New Haven Community Hospital, 137
Conn. 508, 79 A. 2d 353 (1951); Tochetti v. Cyril & Julia C. Johnson Me-
morial Hospital, 130 Conn. 123, 36 A. 2d 381 (1944); Evans v. Lawrence &
Memorial Associated Hospitals, 133 Conn. 311, 50 A. 2d 443 (1946); Hearns
v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 A. 595, 31 L. R. A. 224 (1895); Cash-
man v. Meriden Hospital, 117 Conn. 585, 169 A. 915 (1933); Cristine v. Grif-
fin Hospital, 134 Conn. 282, 57 A. 2d 262 (1948); Durant v. Grace-New Haven
Community Hospital, 20 Conn. Supp. 19, 119 A. 2d 743 (1955); McDermott
v. St. Mary's Hospital Corp., 144 Conn. 417, 133 A. 2d 608 (1957); Parowski
v. Bridgeport Hospital, 144 Conn. 531, 134 A. 2d 834 (1957).
152 St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N. E. 537, 33 A. L. R.
1361 (1924).
153 Lusk v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 199 So. 666 (La. App.,
1941); Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, 123 So. 726 (La. App., 1922); Jurjevich
v. Hotel Dieu, 11 So. 2d 632 (La. App., 1943); Foye v. St. Francis Sani-
tarium & Training School, 2 La. App. 305 (1925); Thibodaux v. Sisters of
Charity, I. W., 11 La. App. 423, 123 So. 466 (1929).
154 Pepke v. Grace Hospital, 130 Mich. 493, 90 N. W. 278 (1902); Bruce v.
Henry Ford Hospital, 254 Mich. 394, 236 N. W. 813 (1931); Re Erwin's Estate,
323 Mich. 114, 34 N. W. 2d 480 (1948); Downes v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich.
555, 60 N. W. 42, 25 L. R. A. 602, 45 Am. St. Rep. 427 (1894); Greatrex v.
Evangelical Deaconess Hospital, 261 Mich. 327, 246 N. W. 137, 86 A. L. R.
487 (1933).
155 Medical and Surgical Memorial Hospital v. Cauthorn, 229 S. W. 2d 932
(Tex. Civ. App., 1949); St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Williamson, 164 S. W. 36
(Tex. Civ. App., 1914); Baylor University v. Boyd, 18 S. W. 2d 700 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1929); Enell v. Baptist Hospital, 45 S. W. 2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1931); Barnes v. Providence Sanitarium, 229 S. W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1921); Steele v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 60 S. W. 2d 1083 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1933); Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Marrable, 244 S. W. 2d 567 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1951); Koenig v. Baylor Hospital, 10 S. W. 2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1928); Armendarez v. Hotel Dieu, 145 S. W. 1030 (Tex. Civ. App., 1912),
later app. 167 S. W. 181 (1919), affd. 210 S. W. 518 (Tex. Com. App., 1919);
Felan v. Lucey, 259 S. W. 2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App., 1953); Baptist Memorial
Hospital v. McTighe, 303 S. W. 2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App., 1957); Penaloza v.
Baptist Memorial Hospital, 304 S. W. 2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App., 1957).
156 Hospital of St. Thomas v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S. E. 13, 51 L. R. A.
N. S. 1025 (1914); Weston v. Hospital of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S. E.
785, 23 A. L. R. 907 (1921); Walker v. Memorial Hospital, 187 Va. 5, 45 S. E.
2d 898 (1948); Norfolk Protestant Hospital v. Plunkett, 162 Va. 151, 173
S. E. 363 (1934).
157 Roberts v. Ohio Valley General Hospital, 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S. E. 318,
42 A. L. R. 968 (1925).




Georgia, 15 9 and possibly North Carolina,1 0 the charitable hospital
may be liable to the paying patient regardless of whether the
negligence is administrative or medical.
No cases could be found reported in Montana, New Mexico
and South Dakota.
Of course, wherever liability is permitted, it is under the
same rules as are outlined in the section above on private hos-
pitals.
Public Hospitals
In the absence of a statute abrogating immunity, the liability
of a hospital operated by a governmental unit or agency depends
upon whether the hospital is maintained and operated in the
exercise of a governmental or of a proprietary function.
A governmental unit or agency is generally immune from
liability for torts committed in connection with operating a hos-
pital where it is operated in performance of governmental func-
tions;16 while it is generally liable where it is operated in per-
formance of a proprietary or "corporate" function . 6 2 There is
no general standard used by the courts to determine whether the
159 Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (1918); Georgia
Baptist Hospital v. Smith, 37 Ga. App. 92, 139 S. E. 101 (1927); Mitchell v.
Executive Committee of Baptist Conventions, 49 Ga. App. 615, 176 S. E. 669
(1934); Medical College of Georgia v. Rushing, 1 Ga. App. 468, 57 S. E. 1083
(1907); Robertson v. Executive Committee of Baptist Convention, 55 Ga.
App. 469, 190 S. E. 432 (1937); Starr v. Emory University, 93 Ga. App. 864,
93 S. E. 2d 399 (1956); Executive Committee of Baptist Convention v. Fer-
guson, 95 Ga. App. 393, 98 S. E. 2d 50 (1957).
160 Cowans v. North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, 199 N. C. 41, 147 S. E. 672
(1929); Williams v. Union County Hospital Asso., 234 N. C. 536, 67 S. E. 2d
662 (1951); Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 83 S. E. 807, Ann. Cas. 1916E 250
(1914); Barden v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 152 N. C. 318, 67 S. E. 971, 49
L. R. A. N. S. 801 (1910); Johnson v. City Hospital Co., 196 N. C. 610, 146
S. E. 573 (1929).
161 Laney v. Jefferson County, 249 Ala. 612, 32 So. 542 (1947); Madison v.
San Francisco, 106 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234 P. 2d 995 (1951); Schwalb v. Con-
nely, 116 Colo. 195, 179 P. 2d 667 (1947); Brunswick v. Barrett, 58 Ga. App.
792, 199 S. E. 901 (1938); Van Pelt v. Louisville, 257 Ky. 256, 77 S. W. 2d
942 (1935); Martinson v. Alpena, 328 Mich. 595, 44 N. W. 2d 148 (1950);
Schroeder v. St. Louis, 360 Mo. 293, 228 S. W. 2d 677, 25 A. L. R. 2d 200
(1950); Kress v. Newark, 8 N. J. 562, 86 A. 2d 185 (1951); Talley v. Northern
San Diego County Hospital Dist., - Cal. -, 257 P. 2d 22 (1953); Hitchings
v. Albemarle Hospital, 220 F. 2d 716 (C. A. 2d 1955); Smith v. City of
Dallas, 248 S. W. 2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App., 1952).
162 Kardulas v. City of Dover, 99 N. H. 359, 111 A. 2d 327 (1955); Henderson
v. Twin Falls County, 56 Idaho 124, 50 P. 2d 597, 101 A. L. R. 1151 (1935);
Anderson v. Portland, 130 Me. 214, 154 A. 572 (1931); Gillies v. Minneapolis,
66 F. Supp. 467 (D. C. Minn., 1946); Okmulgee v. Carlton, 180 Okla. 605, 71
P. 2d 722, 2 N. C. C. A. N. S. 325 (1937); Carlson v. Marinette County, 264
Wis. 423, 59 N. W. 2d 486 (1953); Akopiante v. Board of County Com'rs. of
Otero County, - N. M. -, 333 P. 2d 611 (1959).
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maintenance of the hospital is governmental or proprietary. It
has been said that if the hospital is operated for the purpose of
conserving public health, treating indigent patients, and applying
money receipts to expenses, then generally it will be held to be
the exercise of a governmental function; 163 but operating a hos-
pital for the purpose of making a pecuniary profit probably will
be held to be performance of a proprietary function.16 4 The fact
that a charge for service is imposed on those able to pay does not,
of itself, affect the immunity of the governmental unit or agency; 165
nor does the fact that a paying patient is the victim of the negli-
gence alter the immunity rule.166 Furthermore, if the hospital is
a charitable one, the rules applicable to charitable hospitals, i.e.,
as to whether there is immunity or not, may be controlling.167
Although a few jurisdictions have rested their decisions on
the ground that no mandatory duty was imposed by statute upon
the governmental unit to operate a hospital,168 the majority sus-
tain immunity even though the statute under which the hospital
was created is only permissive.'6 9 And it has been generally held
that a governmental unit is not liable for damages resulting from
tortious acts that are wholly outside the powers conferred upon
it by its charter or other legislative enactments. 170
163 Kreiss v. Newark, 8 N. J. 562, 86 A. 2d 185 (1951). See also Jerauld
County v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 76 S. D. 1, 71 N. W. 2d 571 (1955).
164 Beard v. San Francisco, 79 Cal. App. 2d 753, 180 P. 2d 744 (1947). But
see Dallas v. Cramer, 207 S. W. 2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App., 1947).
165 Moore v. Walker County, 236 Ala. 688, 185 So. 175 (1938); Latham v.
Santa Clara County Hospital, 104 Cal. App. 2d 336, 231 P. 2d 513 (1951);
Martinson v. Alpena, supra, n. 161; Gillies v. Minneapolis, supra, n. 162;
Schroeder v. St. Louis, supra, n. 161; Shaffer v. Monongalia General Hos-
pital, - W. Va. -, 62 S. E. 2d 795 (1950); Madison v. San Francisco, supra,
n. 161; Waterman v. Los Angeles County General Hospital, 123 Cal. App. 143,
266 P. 2d 221 (1954).
166 Moore v. Walker County, supra, n. 165; Madison v. San Francisco, supra,
n. 161; Dallas v. Cramer, supra, n. 164.
167 Washington v. U. S., 100 Ct. Cl. 491 (1944); McAllen v. Gartman, 81
S. W. 2d 147, (Tex. Civ. App., 1935), affd. 130 Tex. 237, 107 S. W. 2d 879
(1936). But the fact that many jurisdictions now grant tort liability in the
case of negligence of private charities is leading the same jurisdictions to
grant such liability for governmental charities. Kress v. Newark, 9 N. J.
Super. 70, 74 A. 2d 902 (1950); Bush v. Binghamton City Hospital, 251 App.
Div. 601, 297 N. Y. Supp. 991 (1937).
168 Henderson v. Twin Falls County, supra, n. 162; Okmulgee v. Carlton,
supra, n. 162.
169 Ware County v. Cason, 189 Ga. 78, 5 S. E. 2d 339 (1939); Young v. Wor-
cester, 253 Mass. 481, 149 N. E. 204 (1925); Martinson v. Alpena, supra, n.
161.
170 Laney v. Jefferson County, supra, n. 161; Calkins v. Newton, 36 Cal.
App. 2d 262, 97 P. 2d 336, 231 P. 2d 995 (1951); Dallas v. Smith, 130 Tex.




Some jurisdictions appear to differentiate between hospitals
operated by municipal corporations and those operated by coun-
ties, holding that a county necessarily performs a governmental
function in establishing such a hospital.171 This is probably due
to the fact that a county is considered to be a quasi-corporate
entity which exists only for the political convenience of the
state, 17 2 whereas a municipal corporation exists for the conven-
ience of the people. 173
In New York 174 and in the federal jurisdiction'7" statutes
have been passed which waive the governmental immunity from
liability and suit, thus making the doctrine of respondeat superior
applicable. Under the federal statute, the existence and extent
of liability is governed by the law of the place where the tort
was committed. 176 This means that even though the statute has
abrogated the immunity of the United States Government, if a
state does not hold liable a charitable hospital (e.g., and the par-
ticular governmental hospital in question is a charitable hos-
pital) then no liability will arise.' 77 New York has also passed a
statute which makes its cities liable for torts committed by their
employees in hospitals, even to the extent of liability for the
malpractice of its physicians and surgeons when they are acting
within the course and scope of their employment. 17
8
Several other states now have statutes abrogating their im-
munity to suit, but many of the courts in these states have held
that such statutes do not abrogate the state's immunity to li-
ability for damages. 179 Thus they have not resulted in any great
change in the general liability of governmental units.
171 Ware County v. Cason, supra, n. 169; O'Brien v. Rockingham County,
80 N. H. 522, 120 A. 254 (1923); Johnson v. Hamilton County, 156 Tenn. 298,
1 S. W. 2d 528 (1927); Albaeck v. Santa Barbara County, 123 Cal. App. 2d
336, 266 P. 2d 884 (1954); Pike v. Archibald, 118 Cal. App. 2d 114, 257 P. 2d 480
(1953); Thomas v. Board of County Com'rs. of Prince George's County, 200
Md. 554, 92 A. 2d 452 (1952); Elliott v. Lea County, 58 N. M. 147, 267 P. 2d
131 (1954); Burns v. American Cas. Co., - Cal. App. -, 269 P. 2d 656,
(1954), subsequent op. 127 Cal. App. 2d 198, 273 P. 2d 605 (1954).
172 Culler v. Jackson Tp., Putnam County, - Mo. -, 249 S. W. 2d 393
(1952).
173 Anderson v. Portland, supra, n. 162; Kamau v. County of Hawaii, 41
Haw. 527 (19 ).
174 Court of Claims Act. §§ 10 et seq.
175 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. Secs. 2671 et seq.
176 28 U. S. C. § 2674.
177 Washington v. U. S., supra, n. 167.
178 Gen. Mun. Law §§ 50 et seq.
179 Jerauld County v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., supra, n. 163.
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Conclusion
As can be readily seen from the foregoing, the law govern-
ing tort liability of hospitals is now in a state of flux. Some of
the defenses, such as ultra vires and the borrowed servant doc-
trine, are being disallowed. Use of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is increasing. And, possibly most important of all for
the patient, the concept that nurses, interns and even technicians
may be independent contractors is rapidly dying out. The hos-
pital's immunity for torts of staff physicians is also on the wane.
Charitable and governmental immunity are being discarded,
which is a good thing since it is inconceivable in this day and
age that we would deny recovery from a charity which can
readily be adequately protected by insurance or a governmental
entity, merely because of the old and out-moded doctrine that
the king (government) can do no wrong. It therefore appears
that in the very near future all hospitals will be liable for any
tort committed by an employee within the course and scope of
his employment.
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